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JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is proper in this court pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated §78-2A-3(f) (1953). 
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Did the trial court err when it substituted the judge's 
opinion as to what is best for the Defendant and refused to 
instruct the jury on the requested lesser-included offense of 
disobeying a peace officer pursuant to case law and Utah Code 
Annotated §76-1-402. (R. at 102-105). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standard of review presents a question of law. 
Therefore, the appellate court should review the trial court's 
determination concerning jury instructions for correctness and 
accord it no particular deference. State v. Jones, 878 P.2d 
1175, 243 Utah Adv. Rep. 35 (Utah App. 1994). State v. Singh, 
819 P.2d 356, 360 (Utah App. 1991), cert, denied. 832 P.2d (Utah 
1992) . 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
Utah Code Annotated Section 41-6-13 (1953). (See Appendix 1). 
Utah Code Annotated Section 41-6-13.5 (1953). (See Appendix 2). 
Utah Code Annotated Section 76-1-402(3) (4) (5) ( 1953) . (See 
Appendix 3). 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 21(e) (1994). (See Appendix 4). 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This is a case involving an alleged attempt to elude or flee 
a peace officer. 
B. Proceedings Below. 
On March 8, 1994, Defendant Curtis Galen Green Simpson (Mr. 
Simpson) was arrested on Interstate 15 in Millard County, State 
of Utah. On March 9, 1994, a criminal complaint was filed 
against Mr. Simpson charging him with eluding or fleeing a peace 
officer pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 41-6-13.5, a third-degree 
felony. (R. at 2). At trial, Mr. Simpson sought to include in 
the jury instructions a lesser included offense of disobeying a 
peace officer, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 41-6-13. (R. at 
102-105) . The judge determined that it was not in the 
Defendant's best interest to include an instruction on the 
lesser-included offense; consequently, the court denied 
Defendant's request for the proposed jury instruction (R. at 102-
105) and the jury found Defendant guilty of fleeing or eluding a 
peace officer. (R. at 129, 130) . 
A notice of appeal was sent on August 8, 1994. (R. at 119). 
The notice of appeal was filed with the Court of Appeals on 
August 15, 1994. (R. at 120). 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On March 8, 1994, Mr. Simpson was traveling South in Millard 
County on Interstate 15. At mile post 163, deputies from the 
Millard County Sheriff's Department attempted to stop him as a 
suspect in a retail gas theft which had occurred 20 or 25 minutes 
earlier in Scipio, Utah. (Rec. at 76-79). Mr. Simpson failed to 
respond to the flashing lights of the officer's vehicle and 
increased speed to 80 to 85 miles per hour. Mr. Simpson 
continued southbound on 1-15 for 11 miles to mile post 152. (R. 
at 79). At mile post 152 Mr. Simpson voluntarily stopped his 
car, exited his vehicle, and turned himself over to the sheriff's 
deputies. (R. at 94-95). 
Mr. Simpson was charged with eluding or fleeing a peace 
officer pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 41-6-13.5, a third-degree 
felony. At trial, Mr. Simpson sought to include in the jury 
instructions a lesser included offense of disobeying a peace 
officer, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 41-6-13. (R. at 102-
104). The judge determined that it was not in the Defendant's 
best interest to include an instruction on the lesser-included 
offense; consequently, the court denied Defendant's request for 
the proposed jury instruction (R. at 102-105) and the jury found 
Defendant guilty of fleeing or eluding a peace officer. (R. at 
129, 130). 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Both the facts and the issue at bar are very straight 
forward. Mr. Simpson was driving southbound on 1-15 when a 
police car behind him turned on its lights and siren. (R. at 
80). Instead of immediately pulling off the road, Mr. Simpson 
increased his speed from the posted speed limit of 65 mph to 80-
85 miles an hour, at which point he maintained that speed for 
several miles. (R. at 93). Mr. Simpson then complied with the 
police request and pulled off into a rest area, voluntarily 
stopping his car and turning himself over to the sheriff's 
deputies. (R. at 84-89). Except, arguably, for the slight 
increase in speed on an open, empty freeway, there was no effort 
made by Mr. Simpson to evade the deputy--he did not try to outrun 
the police, attempt to turn around and head north-bound, nor take 
an off-ramp to flee or evade pursuit. Instead, he drove along on 
the freeway for a few minutes and then fully complied with all 
requests of the deputies. (R. at 94). His actions were not 
unlike the more famous, or infamous, Mr. Simpson, who led police 
down the freeway for a time in his white Bronco until he quit and 
turned himself over to them. 
The question then becomes whether or not a jury might have 
seen the facts as described above and determined Mr. Simpson's 
actions as a mere disobeying of a peace officer, a class B 
misdemeanor, rather than fleeing or evading a peace officer, a 
third degree felony. The judge determined that in his opinion 
the instruction of the lesser-included offense was not in the 
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Defendant's best interest; therefore, the court did not allow the 
option to be brought to the jury, instructing them only on the 
felony charge. This was reversible error. State v. Baker, 671 
P.2d 152, 159 (Utah, 1983), explains that when a defendant 
requests a lesser-included jury instruction, there is a two-part 
evidence-based test to determine whether or not the trial court 
is required to give it. The first prong of the test is to show 
if the lesser charge "is established by proof of the same or less 
than all of the facts required to establish the commission of the 
offense charged." Id. at 159. This is clearly the case at bar; 
as the elements are the same between the two except the felony 
includes an element of intent to evade or flee that the 
misdemeanor does not. 
The second prong of the test is whether the evidence 
"provides a rational basis for a verdict of acquitting the 
defendant of the offense charged and convicting him of the 
included offense." Id. at 159. The courts have stated that 
where the evidence is susceptible to alternative interpretations, 
and where an alternative would permit acquittal of the greater 
offense and conviction of the lesser, the court must give the 
lesser included offense instruction. State v. Jones, at 36. And 
because the courts must view the facts in a light most favorable 
to the defendant, (State v. Velarde, 734 P.2d 449, 453 (Utah 
1986)), it is reasonable to believe a jury may have determined 
that Mr. Simpson did not intend to flee or evade, but merely 
refused to obey the sheriff's deputy for a time. The test 
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established in State v. Baker has clearly been met and the 
lesser-included instruction should have been given. Mr. Simpson 
is currently in prison for what could be nothing more than a 
traffic violation. The trier of fact was not given the 
opportunity to decide that question. As such, the court's ruling 
should be reversed and Mr. Simpson granted a new trial with the 
lesser-included instruction of disobeying a peace officer given 
to the jury for its determination. 
ARGUMENT 
I. WHETHER AN INSTRUCTION FOR A LESSER-INCLUDED OFFENSE SHOULD 
BE GIVEN TO THE JURY DEPENDS ON THE TEST ESTABLISHED IN 
STATE V, BAKER USING U.C.A. 76-1-402. 
The question of whether or not to include a lesser-included 
charge to the jury in a jury instruction has been repeatedly 
taken on appeal, both in Utah as well as the U.S. Supreme Court. 
There is a large body of law on the issue. See State v. Jones, 
878 P.2d 1175 (Utah App. 1994). State v. Singh, 819 P.2d 356, 
360 (Utah App. 1991), cert, denied. 832 P.2d (Utah 1992). State 
v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152 (Utah, 1983). State v. Standiford, 769 
P.2d 254 (Utah 1988). Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 633 (1980). 
Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, (1973). It is clear from 
these cases that this question is a question of law and therefore 
this court should review the trial court's decision not to 
include the jury instruction for correctness and accord the trial 
court no particular deference. State v. Jones, at 35. State v. 
Singh, at 360. 
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In State v. Baker the Utah Supreme Court gave an in-depth 
analysis of the issue of lesser-included instructions and how to 
determine whether or not to allow the additional charge to be 
presented to the jury. State v. Baker began its analysis by 
giving some historical perspective to the issue, and pointing out 
some confusion in using two different standards. It then creates 
a distinction as to whether or not the motion to include a 
lesser-included offense was brought by the prosecution or the 
defense. 
A. THE STANDARD WHEN THE MOTION IS BROUGHT BY THE 
PROSECUTION. 
Historically, State v. Baker explains, at common law the 
jury was permitted to find the defendant guilty of any lesser 
offense necessarily included in the offense charged. This rule 
originally developed as an aid to the prosecution in cases in 
which the proof failed to establish some element of the crime 
charged. State v. Baker at 155, citing Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 
625, 633 (1980)(citations omitted). This is the "necessarily 
included offense" standard which is found in Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure 21 (e) (1994) : 
The jury may return a verdict of guilty to the offense 
charged or to any offense necessarily included in the 
offense charged or an attempt to commit either the 
offense charged or an offense necessarily included 
therein. 
U.C.A. 76-1-402(5) (1953) also refers to necessarily included 
offenses: 
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If the district court on motion after verdict or 
judgment, or an appellate court on appeal or 
certiorari, shall determine that there is insufficient 
evidence to support a conviction for the offense 
charged but that there is sufficient evidence to 
support a conviction for an included offense and the 
trier of fact necessarily found every fact required for 
conviction of that included offense, the verdict or 
judgment may be set aside or reversed and a judgment of 
conviction entered for the included offense, without 
necessity of a new trial, if such relief is sought by 
the defendant. 
The requirement that the lesser offense be necessarily included 
in the charged offense is for the protection of the defendant, 
and to give the defendant notice that he could at the same time 
face the lesser included offense charge. State v. Baker at 155. 
This stricture has developed from numerous decisions of the 
Supreme Court emphasizing the restrictions that both the common 
law and the Constitution have placed upon the power of the court 
and prosecution to change the charging part of the indictment to 
the jeopardy of the defendant. Id. at 155. 
The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Baker summarizes this 
part of its analysis by holding that the "necessarily included 
offense" standard: 
should be limited to cases where the prosecution 
requests the instruction. The prosecution faces no 
loss of life or liberty at trial and is not 
constitutionally entitled to the same protections 
afforded the defendant. 
Id. at 156. 
B. THE STANDARD WHEN THE MOTION IS BROUGHT BY THE 
DEFENDANT. 
The U.S. Supreme Court in Beck v. Alabama, stated: 
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It has long been recognized that [the lesser-included 
offense] can also be beneficial to the defendant 
because it affords the jury a less drastic alternative 
than the choice between conviction of the offense 
charged and acquittal. 
Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 633 (1980). 
Further, in Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, (1973), the 
High Court held: 
Moreover, it is no answer to petitioner's demand for a 
jury instruction on a lesser offense to argue that a 
defendant may be better off without such an 
instruction. True, if the prosecution has not 
established beyond a reasonable doubt every element of 
the offense charged, the jury must, as a theoretical 
matter, return a verdict of acquittal. But a defendant 
is entitled to a lesser offense instruction--in this 
context or any other--precisely because he should not 
be exposed to the substantial risk that the jury's 
practice will diverge from theory. Where one of the 
elements of the offense charged remains in doubt, but 
the defendant is plainly guilty of some offense, the 
jury is likely to resolve its doubts in favor of 
conviction. 
Keeble, at 212-213 (emphasis in original). 
The Court in Beck also warned of this risk: 
Jurors are not expected to come into the jury box and 
leave behind all that their human experience has taught 
them. The increasing crime rate in this country is a 
source of concern to all Americans. To expect a jury 
to ignore this reality and to find a defendant innocent 
and thereby set him free when the evidence establishes 
beyond doubt that he is guilty of some violent crime 
requires of our juries clinical detachment from the 
reality of human experience.... 
Beck, supra, at 642 (quoting Jacobs v. State, Ala., 361 So. 2d 
640, 651-52 (1978), cert, denied., 439 U.S. 1122 (1979)). 
Thus, where proof of any element of the crime is in dispute, the 
availability of the "third option"--the choice of conviction of a 
lesser offense rather than conviction of the greater or 
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acquittal--gives the defendant the benefit of the reasonable 
doubt standard. State v. Baker at 157. 
The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Baker carefully pointed 
out that the defendant's right to a lesser included offense 
instruction is not absolute or unqualified, and cannot be based 
merely on the "supposed notion of the jury's compassion or 
leniency." United States v. Johnson, 637 F.2d 1224, 1233 (9th 
Cir. 1980)(cited in State v. Baker with approval at 157.) 
The standard which has evolved in this regard is called the 
evidence-based standard, as is widely recognized: 
The principal has, accordingly, evolved that the 
submission of a lesser degree or an included crime is 
justified only where there is some basis in the 
evidence for finding the accused innocent of the higher 
crime, and yet guilty of the lower one. 
State v. Baker at 157-158. 
This holding has been codified in U.C.A. 76-1-402(4) (1953): 
The court shall not be obligated to charge the jury 
with respect to an included offense unless there is a 
rational basis for a verdict acquitting the defendant 
of the offense charged and convicting him of the 
included offense. 
The definitions of an "included offense" are contained in the 
preceding paragraph, 76-1-402(3). That section contains three 
alternative definitions, only one of which, (3)(a), is at issue 
in this case. Paragraph (3)(a) states that an offense is 
included in a charged offense when "it is established by proof of 
the same or less than all the facts required to establish the 
commission of the offense charged." The analysis of whether an 
offense is included for purposes of deciding whether to grant a 
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defendant's request for a jury instruction must therefore begi 
with the proof of facts at trial. If the same facts tend to 
prove elements of more than one statutory offense, then the 
offenses are related under 76-1-402. In that regard the court 
State v. Baker stated: 
However, where two offenses are related because some of 
their statutory elements overlap, and where the 
evidence at trial of the greater offense includes proof 
of some or all of those overlapping elements, the 
lesser offense is an included offense under subsection 
(3) (a) . 
State v. Baker at 159. 
This holding creates the first step of the analysis to be used 
the case at bar. It is essentially a mechanical, side-by-side 
comparison of the statutorily defined elements of the crimes. 
State v. Singh at 368. There is a second step as well: 
Under 76-1-402(4), the court is obligated to instruct 
on the lesser offense only if the evidence offered 
provides a "rational basis for a verdict acquitting the 
defendant of the offense charged and convicting him of 
the included offense." This standard does not require 
the court to weigh the credibility of the evidence, a 
function reserved for the trier of fact. The court 
must only decide whether there is a sufficient quantum 
of evidence presented to justify sending the question 
to the jury, a decision which must be made concerning 
all jury instructions in any trial. When the elements 
of two offenses overlap as discussed [above], if there 
is a sufficient quantum of evidence to raise a jury 
question regarding a lesser offense, then the court 
should instruct the jury regarding the lesser offense. 
State v. Baker at 159. 
The court continues its analysis: 
Similarly, when the evidence is ambiguous and therefore 
susceptible to alternative interpretations, and one 
alternative would permit acquittal of the greater 
offense and conviction of the lesser, a jury question 
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exists and the court must give a lesser included 
offense instruction at the request of the defendant. 
Id at 159. See also, State v. Velarde at 453, State v. Jones at 
36. 
There have been several appellate cases on this issue since State 
v. Baker was published. All of those cases continue to follow 
State v. Baker and its analysis. 
II. THE CASE AT BAR FULFILLS THE REQUIREMENTS OF STATE V. BAKER 
AND REQUIRES THAT THE LESSER INCLUDED INSTRUCTION BE GIVEN. 
With the above legal analysis, it is now possible to assess 
the facts of this case to determine if it indeed fits within the 
test set out by State v. Baker and its progeny. 
Regarding the first prong, it is quite evident that the two 
crimes are related. The crime of disobeying a peace officer is 
found in U.C.A. 41-6-13. The crime of eluding or fleeing a peace 
officer is found in nearly the same place, U.C.A. 41-6-13.5. 
One is apparently an enhancement of the other, which makes the 
comparison of the two quite simple. U.C.A. 41-6-13(1) reads: 
A person may not willfully fail or refuse to comply 
with any lawful order or direction of any peace 
officer, fireman, flagger at a highway construction or 
maintenance site, or uniformed adult school crossing 
guard invested by law with authority to direct, 
control, or regulate traffic. 
In comparison, U.C.A. 41-6-13.5 (1) reads: 
An operator who, having received a visual or audible 
signal from a peace officer to bring his vehicle to a 
stop, operates his vehicle in willful or wanton 
disregard of the signal so as to interfere with or 
endanger the operation of any vehicle or person, or who 
attempts to flee or elude a peace officer by vehicle or 
other means is guilty of a felony of the third degree. 
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Both crimes entail the willful failure or refusal to comply with 
a lawful order or direction of a peace officer. The felony adds 
the element of willful or wanton disregard of the signal which 
leads to the endangerment of any vehicle or person, or an attempt 
to flee or elude a peace officer. As explained above, the two 
offenses are related because some of their statutory elements 
overlap, and because the evidence at trial of the greater offense 
includes proof of those overlapping elements. Accordingly, the 
lesser offense is an included offense under the first prong of 
the test established in State v. Baker. 
The more difficult issue is the second prong, whether the 
evidence presented at the trial could be construed by the jury to 
acquit of the felony and convict of the misdemeanor. In this 
case the facts are not ambiguous, and Mr. Simpson did not take 
the stand. Therefore, this court must review the facts presented 
to determine if two outcomes are possible. 
The evidence showed that on March 8, 1994, Mr. Simpson was 
traveling South in Millard County on Interstate 15. At mile post 
163, deputies from the Millard County Sheriff's Department pulled 
behind him in their vehicles. (R. at 76-79). Mr. Simpson failed 
to respond to the flashing lights of the officers' vehicles and 
increased speed to 80 to 85 miles per hour. Mr. Simpson 
continued southbound on 1-15 for 11 miles to mile post 152. (R. 
at 79). At mile post 152, Mr. Simpson voluntarily stopped his 
car, exited his vehicle, and turned himself over to the sheriff's 
deputies. (R. at 94-95). Also brought out in trial was the fact 
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that Mr. Simpson did not continue to accelerate beyond the 80 to 
85 miles an hour, nor did he attempt to take any exit along the 
way or try to get away from the officers. (R. at 93). When he 
came to a stop it was gradual and Mr. Simpson did not "hop out of 
his vehicle and run," but complied with every one of the 
officer's orders. (R. at 94). 
A review of these facts in the light most favorable to Mr. 
Simpson clearly shows a question of fact of whether Mr. Simpson 
merely disobeyed the flashing lights or whether he intended to 
flee or evade the officers. It is certainly within a reasonable 
purview of the jury to adjudge Mr. Simpson innocent of the felony 
but guilty of the misdemeanor. But without the third option, the 
option of the lesser included crime, the jury had to choose 
between complete acquittal or conviction of the felony and the 
unambiguous evidence showed Mr. Simpson was guilty of some 
criminal activity. As Beck explained: 
To expect a jury to ignore this reality and to find a 
defendant innocent and thereby set him free when the 
evidence establishes beyond doubt that he is guilty of 
some violent crime requires of our juries clinical 
detachment from the reality of human experience.... 
Beck, supra, at 642. 
As explained above, Under 76-1-402(4), the court is obligated to 
instruct on the lesser offense if the evidence offered provides a 
"rational basis for a verdict acquitting the defendant of the 
offense charged and convicting him of the included offense." 
Accordingly, the court committed reversible error in failing to 
follow the test established in State v. Baker and allow the 
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reasonable doubt. If the state fails to prove, in 
effect, the last element of the eluding or fleeing 
charge, then my instructions tell the jury they are. to 
find the defendant not guilty. I think that it is not 
any loss, and not even in his best interest to have a 
lesser included offense of which they might find him 
guilty. If he is guilty of the offense as charged, 
then the lesser included again is of no significance. 
Its absence, I think, is probably in his best 
interests. And counsel has noted his concerns and 
reason for it, and the psychology of jurors. We don't 
know what they do, but I think as a matter of law I 
don't think there's a reason to include that lesser 
included instruction or verdict form. 
(R. 103-104) . 
This logic goes d i rect ] y aga :i nst: wI: Iat: 11 Ie c : i 11: !:  st:ated :i n Keeble : 
Moreover, it is no answer to petitioner's demand for a 
jury instruction on a lesser offense to argue that a 
defendant may be better off without such an 
instruction 
Keeble at 212-213 (complete holding above). 
j n ffae casn at [in , I l)f> (.ouit. substituted i 1 ;•'" 1 don of w.tjr.it. was 
best tor the defendant, rather than allow the defendant to make 
that decision himself. The court had no legal basis for so doing 
as I h. inst iiut i.-n ; Ii u M t, lodi !y hdve been given pursuant to the 
test established in State v. Baker. Accordingly, this matter 
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should be returned to the trial court for retrial with the lesser 
included instruction given to the jury. 
III. HARMLESS ERROR IS NOT AN APPROPRIATE ARGUMENT IN DEFENSE. 
It is important to recognize that harmless error is not a 
proper defense to the issue in this case. There are two 
justifications for this determination. First, where the 
appellate courts have determined no harm could have come to the 
defendant for failing to include the instruction, it has been in 
situations where the facts have shown that another, separate, 
lesser included instruction was given to the jury and the 
defendant was still convicted of the greater charge. The logic 
goes that if the jury convicted the defendant on the greater 
crime where it had an opportunity to convict instead on a related 
lesser-included charge, the jury would also not have convicted of 
a still.lesser-included offense not allowed in by the trial 
judge. See State v. Gotshall. 782 P.2d 459 (Utah 1989) 
(defendant convicted of second-degree murder with a manslaughter 
instruction given, arguing that a negligent homicide instruction 
should also have been given). See also State v. Velarde, supra, 
(which had nearly identical charges at issue.) In the case at bar 
there were no other lesser included instructions given, only the 
felony instruction as charged. 
The second reason harmless error is not appropriate in this 
case comes from the uncontroverted facts argued above. The Utah 
Supreme Court explains in State v. Standiford: 
16 
[State v. Baker] held that a defendant's requested 
lesser included offense instruction must be given when 
there is some evidence which supports the theory 
asserted by defendant. The requirement is more thar i 
procedural nicety; it is rooted in defendant's 
constitutional right to a jury trial. A defendant is 
entitled to have his legal theory of the case placed 
before the jury if it would not be superfluous to do so 
because of an absence of any evidence to support the 
theory. Sometimes prosecutors overcharge, and 
sometimes expected evidence just does not materialize. 
In such cases, instructions on lesser offenses may be 
essential to avoid injustice. Furthermore, juries 
should not: be precluded from determining how criminal 
conduct should be characterized and judged. In all 
events, a defendant has an absolute right to have the 
jury instructed on a lesser crime, as long as there is 
some evidence to support it. 
769 P. 2d 254 UJi:ah 1 988) . 
Defendant ',; tin Miry v\i^  1 IM' Mr, ,( .*••:.- did not - - . empt to flee 
or evade the sherifl by trying to escape off an exit off-ramp, 
turn around, or continue to increase speed, but that he "froze" 
nil*-.! i < l in*1- i' ml ' Mvif d'Mil v\ . ./. situation (R at 120-
L22). The evidence further showed that whei I Mr. Simpson stopped, 
he cooperated fully with the sheriff. He did r t 1 ry !o take the 
Meadow exit to go down some back road. He did not skip the 
median and. turn north. He did not stop and bolt from his car on 
foot into the d a rk n ess. In other words Ii Jid nol elude or flee 
a peace officer, even though, he did disobey an officer of the 
law It., was then stated that disobeying an officer of the law is 
not a felony and so he should be acquitted, As the. Utah Supreme 
Coui t stated above, the prosecution may well have overcharged the 
Defendant, therefore the lesser included instruction needed to be 
given to allow the ji iry to determine' how • i i na L -"oiiduci should 
be characterized and adjudged. There is no ambiguity in the 
facts, only in whether the facts should require a felony-
conviction or misdemeanor. Such a decision belongs to the trier 
of fact, and is "rooted in defendant's constitutional right to a 
jury trial." State v. Standiford. 769 P.2d 254 (Utah 1988). 
CONCLUSION 
According to the Utah Supreme Court, and pursuant to U.C.A. 
76-1-402(4), when a defendant requests a lesser-included jury 
instruction, there is a two-part evidence-based test to determine 
whether or not the trial court is required to give it. First, is 
the lesser charge established by proof of the same or less than 
all of the facts required to establish the commission of the 
offense charged? Second, does the evidence provide a rational 
basis for a verdict of acquitting the defendant of the offense 
charged and convicting him of the included offense? 
In the case at bar, the elements to both charges are the 
same except that the felony charge includes an element of intent 
to evade or flee, which the misdemeanor does not. Therefore, the 
answer to the first question is yes, the lesser charge is 
established by proof of less than all of the facts required to 
establish the greater offense. Responding to the second 
question, the courts have stated that where the evidence is 
susceptible to alternative interpretations, and where an 
alternative would permit acquittal of the greater offense and 
conviction of the lesser, the court must give the lesser included 
offense instruction. 
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By instructing the jury on] y on the iei . 
did not allow the opti on of a ] esser included offens- : . - e 
brought to the jin:y. This was reversible ::_• And because the 
courts must view the facts in a light muyu ic tble r o niie 
defendant, ii i:* i ^ asonabj o • . . ^ V P a -in-r* ••;/ have determined 
that Mr Simpson did not intend ;-„• :'.!-•« • ^\ra:i- but merely 
refused to obey the sheriff's aeput** J Th<- two-part 
evidence •-b."3 5^ :: :1 I osl I o determine whether 01 not. the trial court 
is required to givpH the lesser-included instruction has clearly 
been met; consequently, the lesser • i nc 1 nd* ,1 i nsli notion should 
have 1 
Defendai:* respectfully requests this Court to reverse the 
trial * o jLuiing and grant: I" "h" , ,S irnpscjii a new trial a] lowing 
I he ji e opportunity to decide on the lesser-included 
instrucz2^ .1 .: : isobeying a peace of f icer, 
DATED THIS Jj^f\ day- of Kebruaiy, J '5. 
FISHER, SCRIBNER, MOODY & ST1RLAND P.C. 
THOMAS J. SCRIBI 
Attorneys f o ? ppf end an t / Appe 1.1 ant 
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APPENDIX 
^ 1 
41-6-13. Obedience to peace officer or other traffic con-
trollers. 
(1) A person may not willfully fail or refuse to comply with any lawful order 
or direction of any peace officer, fireman, flagger at a highway construction or 
maintenance site, or uniformed adult school crossing guard invested by law 
with authority to direct, control, or regulate traffic. 
(2) When flaggers at highway construction or maintenance sites are direct-
ing traffic they shall use devices and procedures conforming to the latest 
edition of the "Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices for Streets and 
Highways." 
APPENDIX ! 
41-6-13.5. Failure to respond to officer's signal to stop — 
Fleeing — Causing property damage or bodily 
injury — Suspension of driver's license — Forfei-
ture of vehicle — Penalties. 
(1) An operator who, having received a visual or audible signal from a 
peace officer to bring his vehicle to a stop, operates his vehicle in willful or 
wanton disregard of the signal so as to interfere with or endanger the opera-
tion of any vehicle or person, or who attempts to flee or elude a peace officer by 
vehicle or other means is guilty of a felony of the third degree. The court shall, 
as part of any sentence under this subsection, impose a fine of not less than 
$1,000. 
(2) An operator who violates Subsection (1) and while so doing causes death 
or serious bodily injury to another person, under circumstances not amount-
ing to murder or aggravated murder, is guilty of a felony of the second degree. 
The court shall, as part of any sentence under this subsection, impose a fine of 
not less than $5,000. 
(3) (a) In addition to the penalty provided under this section or any other 
section, an operator who, having received a visual or audible signal from 
a peace officer to bring his vehicle to a stop, operates his vehicle in willful 
or wanton disregard of the signal so as to interfere with or endanger the 
operation of any vehicle or person, or who attempts to flee or elude a 
peace officer by vehicle or other means, shall have his driver's license 
revoked pursuant to Subsection 41-2-127(l)(h) [53-3-220(l)(h)] for a pe-
riod of one year. 
(b) The court shall collect the driver's license to be revoked and forward 
it to the Division of Drivers' License Services, along with a report of the 
conviction. If the court is unable to collect the driver's license, the court 
shall nevertheless forward the report to the division. If the person is the 
holder of a driver's license from another jurisdiction, the court shall not 
collect the driver's license but shall notify the division and the division 
shall notify the appropriate officials in the licensing state. 
APPENDIX 3 
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76-1-402. Separate offenses arising out of single criminal 
episode — Included offenses. 
(1) A defendant may be prosecuted in a single criminal action for all 
separate offenses arising out of a single criminal episode; however, when the 
same act of a defendant under a single criminal episode shall establish offenses 
which may be punished in different ways under different provisions of this 
code, the act shall be punishable under only one such provision; an acquittal or 
conviction and sentence under any such provision bars a prosecution under 
any other such provision. 
(2) Whenever conduct may establish separate offenses under a single 
criminal episode, unless the court otherwise orders to promote justice, a 
defendant shall not be subject to separate trials for multiple offenses when: 
(a) The offenses are within the jurisdiction of a single court; and 
(b) The offenses are known to the prosecuting attorney at the time the 
defendant is arraigned on the first information or indictment. 
(3) A defendant may be convicted of an offense included in the offense 
charged but may not be convicted of both the offense charged and the included 
offense. An offense is so included when: 
(a) It is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts 
required to establish the commission of the offense charged; or 
(b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation, conspiracy, or form of prepa-
ration to commit the offense charged or an offense otherwise included 
therein; or 
(c) It is specifically designated by a statute as a lesser included offense. 
(4) The court shall not be obligated to charge the jury with respect to an 
included offense unless there is a rational basis for a verdict acquitting the 
defendant of the offense charged and convicting him of the included offense. 
(5) If the district court on motion after verdict or judgment, or an appellate 
court on appeal or certiorari, shall determine that there is insufficient evidence 
to support a conviction for the offense charged but that there is sufficient 
evidence to support a conviction for an included offense and the trier of fact 
necessarily found every fact required for conviction of that included offense, 
the verdict or judgment of conviction may be set aside or reversed and a 
judgment of conviction entered for the included offense, without necessity of a 
new trial, if such relief is sought by the defendant. 
APPENDIX 4 
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Rule 21. Verdict. 
(a) The verdict of the jury shall be either "guilty" or "not guilty," "not 
guilty by reason of insanity," "guilty and mentally ill," or "not guilty of the 
crime charged but guilty of a lesser included offense," or "not guilty of the 
crime charged but guilty of a lesser included offense and mentally ill" pro-
vided that when the defense of mental illness has been asserted and the 
defendant is acquitted on the ground that he was insane at the time of the 
commission of the offense charged, the verdict shall be "not guilty by reason of 
insanity." 
(b) The verdict shall be unanimous. It shall be returned by the jury to the 
judge in open court and in the presence of the defendant and counsel. If the 
defendant voluntarily absents himself, the verdict may be received in his 
absence. 
(c) If there are two or more defendants, the jury at any time during its 
deliberations may return a verdict or verdicts with respect to any defendant 
as to whom it has agreed. If the jury cannot agree with respect to all, the 
defendant or defendants as to whom it does not agree may be tried again. 
(d) When the defendant may be convicted of more than one offense charged, 
each offense of which the defendant is convicted shall be stated separately in 
the verdict. 
(e) The jury may return a verdict of guilty to the offense charged or to any 
offense necessarily included in the offense charged or an attempt to commit 
either the offense charged or an offense necessarily included therein. 
(f) When a verdict is returned and before it is recorded, the jury shall be 
polled at the request of any party or may be polled at the court's own instance-
If, upon the poll, there is no unanimous concurrence, the jury may be directed 
to retire for farther deliberations or may be discharged. If the verdict is unani-
mous, it shall be recorded. 
(g) If judgment of acquittal is given on a verdict or the case is dismissed and 
the defendant is not detained for any other legal cause, he shall be discharged 
gs soon as the judgment is given. If a verdict of guilty is returned, the court 
may order the defendant to be taken into custody to await judgment on the 
verdict or may permit the defendant to remain on bail. 
